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Much ink has already been spilt to explain the collapse in global capitalization and the 
resultant ‘Great Recession’.  To take the FT Global 500 – a listing of the world’s largest firms 
by market value or capitalization – as one measure of the global financial crisis, from June 
2008 to May 2009 the market capitalization of the world’s leading firms fell ‘by 42 per cent 
from $26,831bn to $15,617bn.’1  In other words, in less than a year, investors from around 
the  world  deemed that  the  world’s  leading  companies  were  worth  just  slightly  over  half  of  
their value in 2008.  There were other signs of a global crisis: falling property values, factory 
and business foreclosures, rising unemployment and protest, mounting personal bankruptcies, 
bank failures, fears over sovereign debt and the oscillation of experts fearing at one time 
inflation  and  at  another  deflation.   The  root  cause  of  the  crisis  was  sought  in  a  faulty  
ideology, a real estate bubble, rampant greed, corporate bonus structures, easy credit, 
predatory lending, new evaluations of risk, exotic financial instruments and global 
imbalances of trade and finance.  While these factors certainly contributed to the global 
financial crisis, what most missed or underplayed was the dramatic increase in the cost of oil 
from 2001 to 2008.  What role might the cost of the world’s most valuable commodity have 
played in precipitating or generating the crisis?  
Jeff Rubin, formerly of CIBC World Markets and Peter Buchanan argued that the crash in 
global markets had its origins in the enormous leap in the price of oil from just about $30 
dollars a barrel in 2001 to $147 dollars a barrel by 2008.2  It is worth noting that this spike in 
prices was over twice the amount of the previous major price spikes in 1973 and 1979 which 
also plunged economies into recession and brought about what became known as the Third 
World Debt Crisis by the private bank recycling of petrodollar windfalls.  The reason why the 
escalation of oil prices may have precipitated the crisis argue Rubin and Buchanan is not only 
because previous oil price hikes have led to recession, but for the more important reason that 
wages are not generally elastic and when people have to spend more money on petroleum 
based goods such as gasoline, this reduces the demand for other goods and services causing 
future profit expectations to be adjusted rapidly downward in due time.  Another hint that the 
price of oil precipitated the global crisis was that Japan and Euroland economies – both very 
sensitive  to  oil  price  rises  -  were  in  recession  well  before  the  banking  crisis  in  the  United  
States.   In testimony to the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, the professor of 
economics James D. Hamilton echoed the bankers search for the root cause of the crisis also 
pointing to the rapid increase in the cost of fuel: 
Big increases in the price of oil that were associated with events such as the 1973- 
74 embargo by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, the 
Iranian Revolution in 1978, the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, and the First Persian Gulf 
War in 1990 were each followed by global economic recessions.  
                                                             
1 Anne-Britt Dullfo, ‘FT Global 500 2009’, Financial Times, May 29, 2009. 
2 Jeff Rubin and Peter Buchanan, ’What’s the Real Cause of the Global Recession’, StrategEcon, October 31, 
2008.   
 
The price of oil doubled between June 2007 and June 2008, a bigger price 
increase than in any of those four earlier episodes. In my mind, there is no 
question that this latest surge in oil prices was an important factor that contributed 
to the economic recession that began in the U.S. in 2007:Q4.3   
 
Whether there can be one single cause for the crisis of 2007-9 is entirely debatable.  But 
focusing on the cost of oil is important because unlike the crises of 1973 or 1979 that were 
largely allayed by the precipitous drop in the price of oil, a motley crew of scholars, students, 
geologists, businesspeople and concerned citizens are waking up to an inconvenient truth: 
given the imminent peak of global oil production, high prices for petroleum and petroleum 
based products will be here to stay.  There will never again, suggest many analysts, be a 
return to an age of cheap fossil fuel energy.4  If this assessment is correct, then a far deeper, 
more substantial and more widespread crisis looms on the horizon: the crisis of a worldwide 
market civilization and its high-energy intensive forms of globalized social reproduction.  
Indeed, according to a number of observers the 21st century will bid farewell to accessible, 
abundant and affordable fossil fuels – the primarily energy source powering globalized forms 
of social reproduction.  
It is worth taking a moment at the outset to consider what I mean by globalized social 
reproduction.  While social reproduction could be considered a contested concept, the term is 
typically used to draw our attention to the material and/or biological patterns, contradictions 
and transformations of everyday life.  We should be clear here that while for some, using the 
term may lead to a form of biological or material determinism, nothing of the sort is intended 
here.  Patterns of social reproduction should always be theorized in movement.  What I mean 
by social reproduction is the ways in which any society produces, consumes and reproduces 
its  life  and  lifestyles,  how  it  conceptualizes  and  understands  these  actions,  and  also  how  it  
defends and/or justifies its particular pattern of historical development that is always open to 
change.  To use the term ‘globalized social reproduction’ then, is to emphasize the degree to 
which the everyday lives of a significant portion of humanity have been restructured by 
processes  of  globalization.   Cindi  Katz,  Saskia  Sassen,  Isabella  Bakker  and  Stephen  Gill  
among others have already done a great deal to theorize and provide empirical detail for the 
ways in which everyday patterns of social reproduction have been restructured and 
                                                             
3 James D. Hamilton, ‘Oil Prices and the Economic Downturn’, Testimony Prepared for the Joint Economic 
Committee of the US Congress.  May 20, 2009.  http://www.house.gov/jec/news/2009/Hamilton_testimony.pdf 
(June 1, 2010). 
4 For an overview of the debate on peak oil see, Jeremy Leggett, ‘What they don’t want you to know about the 
coming oil crisis’, The Independent, January 20, 2006.  Books that discuss this phenomenon at greater length 
include: Paul Roberts, The End of Oil.  (New York: First Marnier Books), 2005, Richard Heinburg, The Party’s 
Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies.  (Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers), 2003, Richard 
Heinburg, Powerdown: Options and Actions for a Post-Carbon World.  (Gabriola Island: New Society 
Publishers), 2004, James Howard Kunstler, The Longer Emergency.  (New York: Grove Press), 2005, Michael 
Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy.  (New York: Metropolitan Books), 
2008, and Kenneth F. Deffeys, Beyond Oil: The View from Hubbert’s Peak.  (New York: Hill & Wang), 2006.   
reconfigured under conditions of globalization.5  There are obviously scales and degrees as 
well as racial and gendered dimensions of globalized social reproduction with their attendant 
geographies and vulnerabilities, but what is missing from the debate so far is the degree to 
which these social transformations were made possible by fossil capitalism or the abundance 
and availability of cheap energy.  In the face of peak fossil fuel production – what Smil has 
called our solar inheritance – we might ask whether Westernized patterns of social 
reproduction can be sustained let alone extended to the rest of the world.    
In  order  to  begin  an  assessment  of  this  question  I  want  to  focus  on  the  hyper-modern  city-
state of Dubai.   Mike Davis has already done a great deal to focus critical light on Dubai’s 
ambitious attempt to turn the desert into a showcase of capitalist excess built on the backs of 
exploited labor and high oil prices.6  In this article, however, I want to focus more on what 
Dubai might tell us about the future of a fossil fuel based global economy and globalized 
patterns of social reproduction.  In many ways, Dubai is unique because of its ruler’s desire to 
finance a built environment unlike anywhere else in the world.  Dubai is a built environment 
of  built  environments  but  taken  as  a  whole,  it  is  designed  as  a  playground  for  the  globe’s  
affluent.  In many ways it reflects, in a microcosm and in hyperbolic form, the capitalist 
aesthetics and aspirations of all global cities built on cheap energy and consumerism.  But a 
focus on Dubai’s energy-intensive pattern of development does more than that.  As a hyper-
modern city founded on petrodollars, borrowed money, a brutal regime of labor exploitation 
and the hope that globalized forms of social reproduction can be sustained over the long-
term, it demonstrates the degree of modern civilization’s madness.  What I mean by madness 
here can be measured in at least two ways.  First, madness can be measured by the degree to 
which global society fails to move swiftly to post-carbon forms of social reproduction given 
the knowledge that the era of cheap and abundant fossil fuels is coming to a close.  Second, 
civilizational madness can be measured by the degree to which investment decisions, rather 
than funding low-carbon alternatives, continues to support energy-intensive built 
environments and social practices.       
To unpack these claims, I have divided the article into three main sections.  In the first 
section, I argue for the importance of what I call the energy-social reproduction-capitalization 
nexus and note how contemporary IR/IPE has largely failed to register the crucial 
interconnections between energy, social reproduction and capitalization.  By taking these 
three interlinked concepts as an ontological starting point, I argue that we can begin to better 
                                                             
5 Cindi Katz, ‘Vagabond Capitalism and the Necessity of Social Reproduction’, Antipode Vol. 2001, pp. 709-72, 
Cindi Katz, Growing up Global: Economic Restructuring and Children’s Everyday Lives.  (Minneapolis 
University  of  Minnesota  Press),  2004,   Katharyne  Mitchell,  Sallie  A.  Marston,  and,  Cindi  Katz  (eds).   Life’s 
Work: Geographies of Social Reproduction.  (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell), 2004, Saskia Sassen, ‘Women’s 
Burden: Counter-Geographies of Globalization and the Feminization of Survival’, Nordic Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 71, 2002, pp. 255-274, Isabella Bakker and Gill, Stephen (eds). Power, Production and 
Social Reproduction.  (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan), 2003, Isabella Bakker, ‘Social Reproduction and the 
Constitution of a Gendered Political Economy,’ New Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2007, pp. 541-556, and 
Isabella Bakker and Rachel Silvey, Beyond States and Markets: The Challenges of Social Reproduction.  (New 
York: Routledge), 2008. 
6 Mike Davis, ‘Fear and Money in Dubai,’ New Left Review, Vol. 41, 2006, pp. 47-68. 
understand our current conjuncture.   In the second section, I then move to offer the reader a 
‘cognitive tour’ of some of most grandiose structures of Dubai’s built environment and finish 
by arguing that what is being capitalized in Dubai is the power of the constitutional monarchy 
and its semi-private, semi-sovereign firms to construct a playground for globalized forms of 
affluent social reproduction.7  In the final section, however, I use the Swedish director Peter 
Cohen’s critical metaphor of an architecture of doom to evaluate Dubai’s project and what 
lessons it might have for the social reproduction of built environments and livelihoods 
founded on non-renewable fossil fuels.   
The Energy- Social Reproduction-Capitalization Nexus 
 
While IR/IPE scholars are familiar with the term ‘material capabilities’, what we should 
understand by the concept remains rather vague.  For example, Robert Cox, who attempted to 
provide a critical schema for understanding international transformations by considering the 
dynamic interplay between ideas, institutions and material capabilities, offered the following 
definition: 
 
Material capabilities are productive and destructive potentials.  In their dynamic 
form these exist as technological and organizational capabilities, and in their 
accumulated forms as natural resources which technology can transform, stocks 
of  equipment  (e.g.  industries  and  armaments  etc.),  and  the  wealth  which  can  
command these.8  
 
Scholars from competing perspectives might agree that this is a suitable definition of material 
capabilities since it is broad enough to can encompass and include a number of material 
phenomena from the internet to nuclear weapons.  It could also be easily agreed that not all 
material capabilities are alike.  But what this broad definition does not tell us is how we 
should assess or even rank material capabilities.  Are two nuclear weapons better than one?  
Is a wired society more vulnerable than one with less reliance on the internet?  Does a larger 
army with greater firepower translate into victory on the battlefield? And as constructivists 
are quick to remind us, material capabilities and their translation into international power 
cannot be understood outside discourse and social relationships, nor, some would argue, 
should they be understood as the primary variable determinative of international outcomes.9  
These problems will likely persist in the debates on the importance of material capabilities 
but what has been overlooked is the role energy plays in undergirding all material capabilities 
                                                             
7 The term ‘social reproduction of affluence’ was first used by Stephen Gill, ‘The Social Reproduction of 
Affluence and Human In/security’, in Isabella Bakker and Gill, Stephen (eds). Power, Production and Social 
Reproduction.  (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan), 2003, pp. 190-207. 
8 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 
10, No. 2, 1981, p. 136.  
9 Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics Vol. 50, No. 2, 
1998, pp. 324-348, Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995, 
pp. 73.  For a critique see, Andreas Bieler, ‘Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in IR Theory: 
Reflections on the Material Structures of Ideas’, Politics Vol. 21, No. 2, 2001, pp. 93-100.   
and social formations.  Indeed, energy or the capacity to do work, is the building block of all 
life on this planet and thus, of all material capabilities.  Those political communities that are 
considered developed or modern are largely the products of intensive energy use derived 
from fossil fuels compared with political communities that lack the infrastructure or access to 
fossil fuels.  Currently, about 2 billion people – or about a third of the human population – 
rely on sources of energy other than fossil  fuels such as wood, straw and cattle dung while 
many others suffer insufficient energy services.10  As the energy expert Vaclav Smil has 
pointed out, ‘less than a sixth of all humanity’ enjoys ‘the benefits of a high-energy 
civilization.’11  The reasons for underdevelopment/poverty and energy inequality are complex 
and heavily debated, but without access to plentiful and low-priced energy, the high energy 
intensive lifestyles and patterns of development of the Global North cannot be replicated.  
For those in doubt, it is worth considering the following scenario offered by Smil: 
 
The  utterly  impossible  option  is  to  extend  the  benefits  of  two  North  American  
high-energy societies (about 330 million people consuming annually some 330 
GJ per capita) to the rest of the world (about 6.5 billion people in 2005).  This 
would require nearly 2.3 ZJ of primary energy, or slightly more than five times 
the current global supply.  Neither the known resources of fossil fuels nor the 
available and prospective extraction and conversion techniques could supply such 
an energy flux by 2030 or 2050…the probability of closing the [energy] gap 
during the coming one or two generations is nil.12              
 
And yet for all its importance, energy is still undertheorized in IR/IPE.  To be sure, the 
literature in IR/IPE does recognize the importance of energy to international politics.  But the 
debates are typically focused on the energy policy of states, the so-called resource curse or 
the implications for state power and security.13  It  is  often  talked  about  as  if  it  is  just  one  
material capability among many that states may want to have in the possession in order to 
project  power.   It  is  almost  never  taken  as  the primary enabler of all other material 
capabilities.  While these debates are important, the role energy plays in undergirding all 
forms of social reproduction – let alone globalized social reproduction - has been sorely 
neglected.  What would it mean to take energy and social reproduction more seriously? 
 
                                                             
10 United Nations Development Programme.  World Energy Assessment: Energy and the Challenge of 
Sustainability.  (New York: UNDP), 2000, p.3. 
11 Vaclav  Smil,  ‘Science,  Energy,  Ethics  and  Civilization’,  in  Raymond  Y.  Chiao  et  al  (eds.),  Visions of 
Discoverty: New Light on Physics, Cosmology, and Consciousness.  (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University 
Press), 2010, pp.  716. 
12 Ibid., p. 716. 
13  The literature is to vast to cite here but see: Michael Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New 
Geopolitics of Energy.  (New York: Holt), 2009, Nader Elhefnawy, ‘The Impending Oil Shock,’ Survival, Vol. 
50, No. 2, 2008, pp. 37-66, and Marshall Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia.  (Oxford 
University Press), 2010, Pami Aalto (ed.), The EU—Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy 
Security. (Aldershot: Ashgate), 2007, Michael L. Ross, ‘Review: The Political Economy of the Resource Curse’, 
World Politics Vol. 51, No. 2, 1999, pp. 297-322. 
First, it would mean a new temporal periodization of the international that focuses on energy 
and social reproduction and the political forms and economic possibilities that stem from 
these practices.  Periodizing history is never a simple task in any discipline but if we think in 
terms of energy, social reproduction and what Braudel called the longue durée then we could 
divide history into three major ages: 1) the pre-fossil fuel age, 2) the age of fossil fuels, and 
3) the post-carbon age.14 
 
Second, it would mean recognizing the historical transition to what Altvater has called ‘fossil 
capitalism’.15  What this means is that the social property relations of capitalism and the 
accumulation of capital are intimately wedded to the energy provided by three major fossil 
fuels: coal, oil and natural gas.  This does not mean that the social property relations of 
capital emerged because of the discovery of fossil fuels but the rather different claim that the 
present day global capitalist economy – not to mention its expansion over the last three 
centuries - is one fully reliant on carbon-based energy.  For this reason providing a new 
ontology that takes the connection between forms of globalized social reproduction and 
energy as a starting point must also have an understanding of the primary process of driving 
economic development: capitalization.     
 
According to the novel theory of capital as power introduced by Bichler and Nitzan, 
capitalization is the process whereby investors discount future earnings into a present value.16  
What this means is that investors want to know how much to pay now for a future stream of 
income.  While this process of assessing future values emerged slowly, Nitzan and Bichler 
argue that:   
 
Capitalization came of age…in the twentieth century.  It was only with the rise of 
the modern corporation and the spread of large-scale financial markets that 
discounting turned from a loose practice to a full-fledged ideology, complete with 
detailed bureaucratic procedures, a rigid ethical code, and trained professional 
cardres…17    
 
Theoretically, anything that generates an income-stream can be capitalized by investors but 
the largest income-streams are typically generated by states in the form of taxes (capitalized 
by government securities or bonds), multinational firms or state run companies.  But while on 
the surface it appears as though investors are simply capitalizing a future stream of income, 
                                                             
14 Some might suggest that this partitioning of time is akin to saying that there was a pre-industrial, industrial 
and post-industrial era.  Why I do not employ these terms is because they obscure what is fundamental to these 
shifts: how humans have harnessed, stored and used energy in different periods.  In other words, I hope my 
labeling of these eras places the importance of energy in the forefront of analysis.     
15 Elmar  Altvater,  ‘Global  Order  and Nature,’  in  Roger  Keil,  David  V.J.  Bell,  Peter  Penz,  and Leesa  Fawcett  
(eds).  Political Ecology: Global and Local.  (NewYork: Routledge), 1998. pp. 19-42. 
16 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder.  (New York: 
Routledge), 2009, p.150. 
17 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder.   (New  York:  
Routledge), 2009, p.155. 
Nitzan and Bichler argue that something much deeper is going on: the ordering and 
reordering  of  the  entire  social  process.   In  order  for  corporations  to  generate  an  income-
stream in the first place, they must exert power over society and actively seek to shape and 
reshape the terrain of social reproduction in their favor while fending off competition from 
other firms who may cut into or cannibalize their income-stream.  For this reason, Nitzan and 
Bichler argue that what is really being capitalized is not earnings per se but the power of the 
firm or state to generate them in the first place.  For example, no investor in their right mind 
would buy US Treasury notes without some understanding that state authorities have the 
power and ability to extract taxes from the public and enforce compliance where necessary.  
Similarly,  no investor in their  right mind would invest  in a company like BP if  it  no longer 
had the capacity to drill for oil offshore.  If, for example, BP was banned from ever drilling 
for  oil  offshore,  investors  would  run  for  the  door.   In  this  sense,  capitalization  can  be  
understood as a measure of power – the power of firms and governments to shape and 
reshape the field of social reproduction.  Following this logic then, we would expect that 
those entities with the highest levels of capitalization to have the most power to structure and 
restructure the social process or the conditions of lived social practices.18  Outside of the most 
highly capitalized governments, we find that the most highly capitalized sector of the global 
economy is oil and gas at US $6729 trillion in 2010.19    What this suggests is that investors 
believe  this  sector  to  be  among  the  most  powerful  forces  shaping  the  terrain  of  social  
reproduction for the sake of accumulation.       
 
Using these three concepts or what I call the energy-social reproduction-capitalization nexus, 
I want to provide a very succinct sketch of how we might understand some of the limitations 
and possibilities in the first two ages identified above. 
The Pre-Fossil Fuel Age (Evolution to 1750 CE)    
Before the age of fossil fuels, the primary source of energy was phytomass (e.g. dung, wood, 
charcoal), human and animal muscle power and some harnessing of wind and water power.  
Even by 1800, only about ten percent of commercial energy was coal based.20  With these 
sources of energy, the range of human capabilities and forms of social reproduction were 
very limited and closely connected up with natural cycles such as the growth of trees.  While 
there were some urban civilizations that managed to harness these primary sources of power 
during this era, most of the human population lived and reproduced their lives in rural or 
natural environments – be they bands of hunters and gatherers or eventually, communities 
                                                             
18 It  should be noted here that Nitzan and Bichler admit that this is not an all encompassing theory of power.  
The theory only seeks to account for capitalism as a mode of power through an analysis of capitalization. 
19 This figure includes both the capitalization of the largest oil and gas firms listed on the FT Global 500 2010 as 
well as the total estimate market value of all state run oil and gas firms listed on the FT Non-Public 150 2006.  
The  figures  were  added by adjusting  for  inflation  at  2.56%.   See,  http://www.ft.com/reports/ft500-2010 (June 
23, 2010) and http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/5de6ef96-8b95-11db-a61f-0000779e2340.html (June 23, 2010). 
20 Bruce Podobnik, Global Energy Shifts: Fostering Sustainability in a Turbulent Age.  (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press), 2006, p. 18. 
founded on agriculture and husbandry.21  Circuits of global trade and finance did exist in this 
period but the pace and scope of what could be called a global economy was restricted by a 
number of factors including limited and risky transportation and communication networks, 
disease, religious mentalities and means of exchange.  Trade was also carried out primarily in 
luxury goods for rulers with the overall population benefiting very little if at all.  The 
population of the globe was also much smaller reaching only about 790 million by the end of 
our period.22  The division and specialization of labor was not extensive or intensive and 
economic growth largely remained low and tied to the productivity of land.  Moreover, war 
and war fighting was far less mobile and total than the major wars of the twentieth century.23  
Given the energy constraints, most communities remained at a subsistence level of social 
reproduction.  In other words, social reproduction was localized with social units and kinship 
networks relying on various overlapping tactics and strategies of self-provisioning such as 
hunting, gathering and later agricultural cultivation and husbandry for survival.  In other 
words, the institution of the market did not mediate the everyday lives of most of humanity.  
But what of capitalization?  Capitalization, where it existed at all, was very circumscribed 
and mostly connected up with rulers, the expansion of taxation, newly chartered companies 
connected to colonial trade, settlement and plunder and small bands of merchant and 
goldsmith financiers.24  
The Age of Fossil Fuels (1750 to Present)25 
The gradual and uneven transition to fossil fuels as a primary source of energy lead to such 
drastic deviations from earlier patterns of development and social reproduction that by 1848 
Marx and Engels could declare that: 
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more 
colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature’s 
forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, 
railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, 
whole populations conjured out of the ground – what earlier century had even a presentiment that 
such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?26   
And Marx and Engels were right to point to the productive forces of social labor – much of it 
freed from feudal strictures in Europe and later elsewhere by waves of what Marx called 
‘primitive  accumulation’  or  the  dispossession  of  people  from  the  land  and  the  abolition  of  
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their customary rights to the commons and other means of survival outside market 
relationships.  But though the analysis put forward by Marx and Engels was sensitive to the 
close interconnections with humans and the natural world, their critical wonderment at 
industrial progress seemed to trump their understanding that this new form of social labor 
was built on the combustion of vast energy dense coal reserves.27  Indeed, throughout the 
process of industrialization coal remained the key primary energy source well into the 
twentieth century when oil eventually overtook it as the key combustible.       
This new supply of energy took ‘from millions to hundreds of millions of years’ to form 
under pressure and heat.  Its extraction and use altered the scope and range of human agency 
and possibility.28  The development of transport and communication networks exploded and 
in Harvey’s terms, ‘annihilated space through time.’  Agriculture, already in the process of 
transformation in the pre-fossil fuel age also grew tremendously in capacity and yields due to 
the fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides provided by petrochemicals.  The global population 
increased dramatically during this period to an estimated 6.6 billion and rising.  Where food 
security existed, the division and specialization of labor intensified and extensified so that 
only a tiny fraction of humanity derives their livelihood and sustenance from outside of 
market relationships.  Warfare and geopolitics also transformed during this period with the 
birth of mobile, total and post-modern forms of war-fighting.  With the solar energy subsidy, 
corporate organization, modern state formation, economic growth and the capitalization of 
firms as well as governments also expanded to perhaps unimaginable proportions.   During 
this period then, forms of social reproduction moved from the rural and local to the city and 
global with over half the world’s population now living in cities and dependent on 
transnational markets for their livelihoods.  The capitalization of the global economy – that is 
to say the expectation that this type of economy will continue - now depends upon abundant, 
affordable and accessible fossil fuels.   
However,  according  to  a  number  of  observers,  at  current  rates  of  global  consumption  and  
projected demand, the twenty-first century will witness a peak in world fossil fuel energy 
production.  Others believe we have already consumed half the recoverable conventional oil 
on the planet and that production is now in a process of decline.  What this will mean for 
forms of globalized social reproduction is difficult to overstress.  When Polanyi described the 
transition to industrial market society he observed that the social transformation was so 
radical and sweeping that it resembled ‘more the metamorphosis of the caterpillar than any 
alteration that can be expressed in terms of continuous growth and development.’ 29   The  
transition to a post-carbon social order promises to be nothing short of another such event.  
One way of interrogating its dimensions is to consider the built environment of Dubai and 
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what the city-state might tell us about the fate of all societies founded on coal and 
hydrocarbons.     
Dubai: From Desertscape to Dreamscape 
 
In the beginning there was sand.  For virtually all of its history, Dubai was a small desert port 
home to traders, fishermen, smugglers and a pearling industry which collapsed in the early 
twentieth century.  The discovery of oil in the Emirate in 1966 combined with foreign 
investment and a brutal regime of labor exploitation helped propel Dubai into what Sassen 
has called a ‘global city’. 30 Of course Dubai is not the only world city that has been built on 
the discovery of fossil fuel deposits and the exploitation of labor.  It is also not the only city 
to feature hyper-globalized and high-energy intensive patterns of development.  What makes 
Dubai unique is its attempt to build a playground for the world’s wealthy unlike any other 
built environment in the world.  It is an example – par excellence – of globalized patterns of 
social reproduction not to mention what Sassen has called global ‘circuits of survival.’31   
 
Under the leadership of Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Dubia is in the process of being 
transformed from an almost uninhabitable desertscape into a dreamscape of hyper-modern 
architectural wonders symbolizing luxury, fantasy, leisure and what local expats call 
‘supreme lifestyles’.  The stated reason for turning the desert into an oasis of free trade zones, 
malls, theme parks, hotels and skyscrapers is that Dubai’s rulers recognize that the wealth 
they derive from their oil has an expiration date.  Indeed, Dubai’s peak oil production came in 
the 1980s and since then has gone into terminal decline.  According to the US Energy 
Information Administration, Dubai’s crude oil reserves stand at a meager 4 billion barrels– 
less than 12 days worth of total world petroleum consumption at 85,534,000 barrels a day.32  
With scarce natural resources given the desert landscape, the future of Dubai’s political 
economy is not only contingent upon providing services to global consumers, but on current 
fossil fueled patterns of globalized social reproduction.  Services such as trading, transport, 
real estate and restaurants and hotels already make up 75% of Dubai’s GDP and its 
development projects are already testament to how Dubai’s leadership envision the future.33  
In order to understand why this future really is a dream and how it speaks to the looming 
crisis of all fossil fueled economies, it is perhaps best to take a virtual tour of the city-state.  
In part, the virtual visitor to Dubai will be aided by my own ethnographic research in the city-
state in March of 2010. 
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Perhaps the first thing to notice is that unlike 
other cities that had to be retro-fitted for the 
automobile and car culture like New York 
City, Dubai (not to mention other ‘artificial’ 
cities like Brasilia) has been wholly 
designed around the automobile.  The city 
was not built for humans but for cars.  With 
a population of just over 2 million 
inhabitants there are already about 1 million 
cars on Dubai’s roads and growing.  This 
has led to relatively severe congestion but 
the city is practically unwalkable.  This is not necessarily because of the blast furnace 
temperatures, but because of the city’s design - there are incredibly long distances between 
destinations.  Dubai does have a public transportation network of busses and a metro and 
monorail system still under construction.  Visitors will notice that virtually every bus stop has 
air conditioning.  Visitors will also notice that they are almost all unoccupied.  This may not 
come as too much of a shock given that only 6% of Dubai’s population currently takes public 
transportation.  The government vows to increase this to 30% by 2020 by investing in better 
infrastructure and better service but at the moment it is hard to envision residents giving up 
the comfort of their air-conditioned cars or relatively inexpensive taxis.34  
 
The next stops on our virtual tour feature some of the principal and most ambitious 
architectural projects that dot the fossil fuel powered built environment.  Consider the Dubai 
Mall.  Currently, it is the world’s largest shopping Mecca by total area – about the size of 50 
football fields. And every square inch is air conditioned. With over one thousand shops 
featuring global brands such as Bloomingdale’s and Pierre Cardin, the mall is only rivaled by 
others such as the South China Mall when judged by total leasable space rather than total 
area.  The Dubai Mall also boasts an Olympic sized indoor skating rink, an indoor theme park 
sponsored  by  SEGA,  a  theatre  with  22  movie  screens,  the  world’s  largest  candy  story  –  
Candylicious, a luxury hotel with 250 rooms to facilitate retail tourism, and the world’s 
largest suspended aquarium with over 30,000 specimens of marine life.  According to Dubai 
City Guide, about three quarters of a million 
people visit the mall every week.  But should 
our traveler tire of skating in the Dubai Mall 
and still have a desire for winter sports in the 
desert, about 40 minutes up the road by metro 
and foot is the Mall of the Emirates.  Dubai’s 
second largest mall, the Mall of the Emirates 
features Ski Dubai, an indoor ski resort 
complete with artificial snow generated by 
thousands of gallons of oil combusting every 
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day of  every  year  of  its  operation.   If  these  two malls  fail  to  satisfy  visitors,  developers  in  
Dubai have already made plans to build the world’s largest mall: the Mall of Arabia.   
 
Leaving the Mall of the Emirates, our next stop is to the Burj Khalifa.  Stretching towards the 
clouds at almost one kilometer high (828 m), the top of the Burj Khalifa is visible from 
almost anywhere in Dubai when the city is not shrouded in smog.  It boasts a number of  
world records and firsts such as the fastest elevator in the world, the highest open-air 
observation deck in the world, and the world’s highest swimming pool.  The building features  
 
a hotel, whose interior was designed by Giorgio Armani, over 1000 private residences, a four 
story fitness complex, thirty-seven floors of corporate suites, a fine dining restaurant on the 
122nd floor and an eleven hectares park with six major water features designed by the same 
firm who built the water installation at the Bellagio in Las Vegas.  
 
 Continuing our tour from the Burj Khalifa, we will arrive shortly at one of the world’s seven 
star  hotels  –  the  Burj  Al  Arab.   ‘Designed  to  
resemble a billowing sail’, for an average $US 1000 
a night since the financial crisis, visitors can enjoy 
perfect views of the 
Arabian  Gulf.   And  all  
suites  are  fitted  with  a  rain  
shower  and  Jacuzzi  where  
one can order the ‘Extreme 
Indulgence’, a butler served plate of caviar, champagne and 
strawberries.  Other features of the world’s most luxurious hotel 
include around the clock butler service, six high-class restaurants, an 
in-hotel helipad for transfers and touring complete with a rooftop red 
carpet, a private beach and ultra-lavish infinity pools.  For a little 
extra,  Richistanis  can  have  access  to  a  fleet  or  Rolls  Royce’s  to  
escort  them  to  and  from  their  destinations  or  rent  one  of  several  
luxury cars like an Aston Martin or a Lamborghini.35  Staying at the hotel also entitles guests 
to visit Wild Wadi Waterpark.  Stretched over twelve acres, Wild Wadi boasts: 
 
…awesome enjoyment, eagle-eyed lifeguards, themed around the adventures of 
Sinbad, Flood River Flyer, splashy attractions, Summit Surge, diving down, 
twists and turns, adrenalin rush, Master Blasters, Flow Riders, packed with 
action,  go  on  I  dare  you,  thrills  and  spills,  high-powered  jets,  aquatic  roller  
coaster, gravity-defying, Rushdown Ravine, white-knuckle rides, Tunnel of 
Doom, expect the unexpected, plunge into the Lazy River, lie back and relax at 
80kph, thunder & lightning, choreographed flash flood…36                 
 
Leaving Wiki Wadi, our cognitive tour leads us to 
another one of the city’s most extravagant hotels: 
Atlantis, The Palm, Dubai.  This seven star 
fantasy architecture resort opened in 2008 and 
features over 1500 rooms.   The hotel has its own, 
much larger, waterpark at ‘42-fun filled acres’ 
called Aquadventure.  Should guests tire of the 
many rides including one that leads to a tunneled 
lagoon for shark viewing, they can always head over to Dolphin Bay where guests can 
interact with dolphins or participate in the Atlantis Royal Swim.  Doing so allows guests ‘to 
swim out to the depths of the lagoon where they can witness the power of dolphins as they 
jump overhead then enjoy the thrill of a dorsal fin tow and a foot push in addition to hugs and 
kisses!’37  The hotel also has its own private beach, seventeen bars, restaurants and lounges 
and a massive aquarium that features 65,000 marine animals that once boasted a baby female 
whale shark.  For guests who prefer something a little more subterranean, the hotel’s Neptune 
and Poseidon Suites offer underwater views from both the bathroom and bedroom.  The 
compound also features avenues filled with luxury boutiques, designer brands, tennis courts, 
more pools, a day spa and various facilities for children.38  Given all these features, there is 
little need for guests to leave the compound to explore the city.  If visitors do leave the resort, 
they would find a vast array of hotels in Dubai with more being constructed and planned at 
the time of this writing.  But alas, we must leave Atlantis and continue our tour of Dubai’s 
dreamscape.   
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As our tour leaves the hotel, tourists may 
want to know that the Atlantis, which 
extends out into the Persian Gulf, is 
actually on the world’s largest artificial 
island in the shape of a palm tree.  Called 
the Palm Jumeriah, the island’s area is as 
large as 800 soccer pitches and features 
miles of beaches, yacht marinas, private 
luxury residences, restaurants, bars and 
many more extravagant hotels and shopping boutiques.  Like Dubai itself, the Palm Jumeirah 
is  a  built  environment  of  built  environments.   Tourists  may  also  want  to  know  that  two  
additional artificial islands in the shape of palm trees are also in development – the Palm 
Jebel Ali and the Palm Deria.  Both will be larger than the Palm Jumeirah and feature a 
plethora of theme parks, luxury residences, marinas, hotels and additional spaces and places 
of globalized consumption.   
 
Rivaling the Palms in artificiality is The World, a series of 300 sand fortified simulated 
islands designed to resemble the earth’s terrestrial formations.  Nakheel’s marketing 
campaign calls it the ‘most innovated real estate development in the world’, ‘a place beyond 
imagination’ and an ‘epic achievement’.39  Islands are advertised as blank canvases to be  
 
developed and are divided into various types: 1) low-density islands to insure residential 
privacy and space for mega-yachts and sea going vessels, 2) mid to high density islands for 
residents, 3) resort islands ‘dedicated to hotel and resort developments’ and 4) commercial 
islands with various retail venues, restaurants and cafes.  The water-way access only islands 
will be connected by a series of transportation hubs and canals with power generation for 
each island being supplied by Dubai’s mainland grid.  Hubs will also desalinate water and 
pump it to elite residents and guests using an intricate system of underwater pipes while each 
island will have its own waste water treatment facilities.  
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There is  much more to see on our cognitive tour but by now our tourist  will  have a decent 
sense of the large-scale energy intensive development projects and the hyper-modern fantasy 
architecture  of  the  city.   But  as  we  return  to  our  hotel,  our  visitor  may want  to  know why 
there are so many unfinished buildings in Dubai that have no sign of being worked on.  Part 
of the reason is due to the global financial crisis and the momentary loss of investor 
confidence.  Without a bailout from Abu Dhabi, Dubai’s oil-rich neighbor, the crisis in Dubai 
could have been far worse.  But while some construction projects have been significantly 
revised, downscaled or are on hold, Dubai intends to continue to build its playground for the 
globe’s affluent minority.   
 
If we return our focus now to the ontology discussed at the beginning of this paper we might 
ask what investors are capitalizing in Dubai?  At first glance it appears as though investors 
are capitalizing the power of the constitutional monarchy and its firms to construct a twenty-
first  century  capitalist  paradise  that  will  continue  to  attract  tourists  from  around  the  world.   
And indeed, in the last two decades investors have been more than happy to have them create 
this future.  But if we consider capitalization in light of energy and social reproduction, what 
investors are really capitalizing is the illusive promise that this pattern of high energy 
intensive globalized social reproduction can continue well into the future.  In its present form, 
Dubai can only exist insofar as fossil fuels remain relatively inexpensive.  In the following 
section, I want to use the Swedish director Peter Cohen’s critical metaphor of an architecture 
of doom to  evaluate  Dubai’s  project  and  what  lessons  it  might  have  for  the  social  
reproduction of built environments and livelihoods founded on non-renewable fossil fuels 
elsewhere. 
Dubai’s Architecture of Doom 
 
In 1989, Peter Cohen directed a documentary called The Architecture of Doom that explored 
Hitler  and  the  Nazi  party’s  obsession  with  aesthetics.   The  film argues  that  Hitler’s  artistic  
vision of the world could be understood by a ‘perverse aesthetic doctrine: to make the world 
beautiful by doing violence to it.’40  Nazi  leadership  wanted  to  beautify  Germany  by  
constructing a world where everything and everyone conformed to Nazi aesthetics principles.  
To do so, however, meant systematically destroying whatever Hitler and his inner circle 
considered deviant, offensive, unhygienic or degenerate.  The aim of the Third Reich was to 
cleanse the entire body politic – its population and its built environment.  Out of this violent 
restructuring a new Germany was to be born through expressions of martial vitality.  To be 
sure, every planned and constructed architectural project symbolized the power of the Nazi’s 
to enforce their vision of a perfect and pure world.41  Hitler’s chief architect, Albert Speer, 
noted that his architecture was designed to represent an intimidating and menacing display of 
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power.42  To make reality conform to Nazi aesthetic principles required nothing short of gas 
chambers and the killing of millions.  But this vision of the world and the power to enforce it 
symbolized by Nazi architecture was ultimately doomed and some of it destroyed in Allied 
bombing campaigns.                     
 
Despite its many megalomaniacal building and architectural projects, Dubai is not Nazi 
Germany.   Nor  were  Germany  and  Dubai  the  first  societies  to  embark  upon  grand  
construction projects to represent their power over others and nature.  But if we think of how 
architecture and the design of cities is not only symbolic of an age and therefore a particular 
pattern of power and social reproduction, we might see in Dubai’s planned playground for the 
affluent a different architecture of doom.  Unlike the Third Reich, Dubai is not organized 
around a campaign to purify the body politic.  It is capitalized by investors and organized on 
the basis of fantasy, leisure, entertainment, luxury, excess and fun.  It offers the world’s 
affluent globalized forms of energy intensive social reproduction built on the backs of and 
serviced by some of the world’s poorest populations whom the Emiratis and managerial ex-
pats  largely  control.   But  the  city  and  the  lifestyles  it  offers  cannot  be  reproduced  over  the  
longer-term due to the fact that their social reproduction is premised on depleting fossil fuels.  
In this sense, Dubai’s built environment of built environments is ultimately doomed.       
 
This is perhaps a cruel irony given that the Emir of Dubai justified his modernization project 
with the full knowledge that the kingdom’s oil would eventually run out.  But if the Emir and 
his coterie of modernizers knew that the oil  fields of Dubai would eventually run dry,  why 
didn’t they draw the further conclusion that the oil fields of other countries would also go into 
terminal decline?  And indeed, according to a number of reports from The Association for the 
Study of Peak Oil and Gas and the German Energy Watch group, global society may have 
already witnessed the peak in oil production with the peak of gas and coal following the first 
decades of the twenty-first century.43  What this means is that the primary energy source 
required to reproduce the globalized lifestyles of Dubai’s fortunate residents and tourists will 
become increasingly scare and increasingly expensive in the decades to come.  What this will 
mean for the majority of the foreign population who construct Dubai’s opulent buildings and 
service the minority of Emiratis, ex-pats and tourists can only be imagined.           
 
Yet Dubai’s rulers and their  sovereign companies not to mention other globally listed firms 
have  designed  and  constructed  a  city  that  requires  evermore  amounts  of  fossil  energy  to  
sustain.  While it is difficult to disaggregate statistics on Dubai in particular, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) – with a population of roughly 7 million - is among the highest consumers of 
energy in the world at 11,832 kilograms of oil equivalent per capita.  Compare the UAE’s use 
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with China’s one billion people at 1484 kg or Germany’s 82 million people at 4027 kg.  
There are only two countries that surpass the UAE’s current consumption: Qatar at 19,504 kg 
and Iceland at 15,708.44  Furthermore,  the total  energy consumption of the UAE is entirely 
fossil fuel based with 65% coming from natural gas and 35% from oil.45  In  other  words,  
Dubai’s energy provisioning is 100% fossil fuel based.  While Dubai’s leadership recognizes 
its need to reduce its carbon footprint and its neighboring Emirate Abu Dhabi is constructing 
the world’s first green energy city at Masdar, its urban design and its US $ 381.4 billion in 
ongoing  tourist  development  projects  tell  another  story.46  The  story  is  also  told  in  Dubai’s  
increasing energy consumption.  According to Dubai Electricity and Water Authority, 
Dubai’s annual electricity peak load went from 5622 megawatts in 2008-9 to 6161 megawatts 
in July of 2010.  Currently Dubai has a load generating capacity of 7830 MW.  Part of this 
electricity generation is used to provide another key resource to Dubai’s residents and 
tourists: water.  Since Dubai has no freshwater resources it must desalinate millions of 
gallons of sea water to sustain its pattern of development.  As of July 2010, this meant 
generating 287 million gallons a day, up from 271 million gallons a day in July of 2009.  
Currently, capacity can generate up to 330 million gallons of desalinated water per day.47  A 
significant portion of this energy and water is actually consumed by the millions of tourists 
that frequent Dubai each year.  And if Dubai wants to meet its target of 15 million tourists a 
year by 2015 (the record is currently 7 million), then evermore amounts of energy will have 
to be produced precisely at a point in time when the International Energy Agency – among 
others – is warning that even current trends of energy production and consumption cannot be 
sustained going forward.   
 
This is why the urban cityscape of Dubai can be conceptualized as an architecture of doom.  
In virtually every dimension, the urban landscape is testament to a form of madness based on 
the short-term thinking and the accumulation of capital.  While its rulers love to bask in 
slogans like ‘The Future is  in Dubai’ what the city will  ultimately reflect  is  the past:  an era 
constructed on the belief that fossil fuel powered development could continue.  If Dubai’s 
leadership really was looking to the future they would have built a completely different city 
premised upon the notion that all future political economies will be post-carbon political 
economies.  When oil starts to reach $200 or $300 a barrel in the coming decades and global 
recession becomes the norm, Dubai’s leadership may finally wake up from its hyper-
capitalist dream to find that no one can afford to play in their sandbox anymore.  Without the 
ability to import millions of foreign consumers for its luxury shopping and leisure 
destinations and with global trade flows grinding to a halt, we can expect that the financial 
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tremors experienced by Dubai in 2009 will pale in comparison to the earthquake in 
capitalization ahead. 
 
But in the East meets West uneven and combined development microcosm of Dubai we can 
also  see  that  all  forms  of  globalized  social  reproduction  and  the  built  environments  that  
support them are doomed due to their extreme reliance on fossil fuels as a primary energy 
source.  With the exception of France at 51.2%, the proportion of fossil fuels in energy 
consumption of the G8 plus China is above 75% (see Table 1 below).48  Outside  the  G8,  
countries that are considered developed, with few exceptions, consumer similar amounts of 
fossil fuel energy.   
TABLE 1 
 
Country Fossil Fuel Energy Consumption (2007)  










And for all the discourse and hype about the emergence of a green and clean global economy, 
the International Energy Agency has projected that by the year 2030, renewables as a primary 
energy source will only make up 19.5% of the world’s total primary energy supply.  At 
67.1%, the IEA estimates that fossil fuels will continue to make up the lion’s share of global 
energy supply.49  At what cost these energy resources will be available to power global trade, 
agriculture, transportation and communication networks by 2030 is perhaps incalculable but 
given projected growing demand and a dwindling supply, they are likely to be very high.  As 
the global economy begins to shrink because of price increases and energy shortages, we can 
expect investment decisions to be adjusted downwards and a precipitous fall in the 
capitalization of global companies – perhaps similar to the one experienced in 2008-2009.  
Unemployment will rise dramatically and basic necessities such as food and water will 
become increasingly more expensive as the recent food riots of 2007-8 attest to.50  Moreover, 
as high-energy intensive lifestyles look increasingly unreproduceable and the conditions of 
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existence  worsen  for  evermore  people,  we  can  expect  mounting  levels  of  social  unrest.   
Indeed, as one recent study noted, it is perhaps likely that the ecological constraint of peak oil 
production (not to mention peak coal and gas production) will lead to the demise of liberal 
ideas and institutions founded on civility and progress.51  Of course there are no crystal balls, 
but imagining oil at two or three hundred dollars a barrel is not very soothing.   
 
Conclusion: Madmen in Broad Daylight 
 
In order to declare the death of God in philosophy Nietzsche sent a madman carrying a 
lantern into a busy marketplace in broad daylight.52  Why  a  madman?   It  was  most  likely  
because Nietzsche knew that such a declaration would appear insane to the majority of 
philosophers who still clung to a God-centered or providential world order.53  The 
declaration, as it was, came too early.  ‘But who killed God?’ asked the madman.  He 
promptly answers his own question and then proceeds to ask a series of questions that address 
the consequences of such a drastic or revolutionary shift: 
 
We have killed him---you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could 
we drink  up  the  sea?  Who gave  us  the  sponge to  wipe  away the  entire  horizon?  What  were  we 
doing  when  we  unchained  this  earth  from  its  sun?  Whither  is  it  moving  now?  Whither  are  we  
moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in 
all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying, as through an infinite nothing? 
Do  we  not  feel  the  breath  of  empty  space?  Has  it  not  become  colder?  Is  not  night  continually  
closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of 
the  noise  of  the  gravediggers  who  are  burying  God?  Do  we  smell  nothing  as  yet  of  the  divine  
decomposition?54   
 
In a similar way, the social  forces of capital  continue to cling to the possibility that  a fossil  
fuel-centered world can continue ad infinitum when our modern market civilization and the 
globalized forms of social reproduction are already dead.  As Smil has noted, modern 
societies are ‘withdrawing accumulated solar capital at rates that will exhaust it in a tiny 
fraction of the time that was needed to create it.’55  Our solar inheritance cannot, he reminds 
us,  be replaced on a civilizational timescale.     Nor,  is  there,  at  the time of this writing any 
known primary energy source that could replace the power provided by fossil fuels.56  Of  
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course those who make such declarations are viewed as pessimists at best, madmen at worst.  
Many  want  to  believe  that  the  high  energy  intensive  patterns  of  globalized  social  
reproduction can continue and even be expanded despite the totally foreseeable end of 
abundant and affordable energy.  These ‘types’, to borrow an expression from Malcolm X’s 
debate at the Oxford Union, tend to believe that some economic law (more market demand 
will automatically lead to more supply) or that some technological miracle will save us.  
However, for those who take energy, social reproduction and capitalization seriously, the 
degree of civilizational madness will be measured by whether global society makes radical 
moves to come to terms with the death of a coal and hydrocarbon based civilization.  A next 
step would then be to struggle for post-carbon forms of social reproduction that will be far 
less  globalized  and  energy-intensive  than  during  the  age  of  fossil  fuels.   The  prospects  of  
failing to do so are not very soothing to contemplate.  In the decades to come, in the midst of 
a dying fossil fuel powered global economy, we may indeed find ourselves asking similar 
Nietzschean questions about where we are going and how all this happened.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Post Carbon Institute, September, 2009.  A copy of the extensive report can be found online at the following 
site: http://www.ifg.org/pdf/Searching%20for%20a%20Miracle_web10nov09.pdf (June 1, 2009). 
